Method for Enhancing Network Security of Transport Layer by Leveraging Lightweight Chain Verification
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    Abstract:

    The transport layer is a key component in the network protocol stack, which is responsible for providing end-to-end services for applications between different hosts. Existing transport layer protocols such as TCP provide users with some basic security protection mechanisms, e.g., error controls and acknowledgments, which ensures the consistency of datagrams sent and received by applications between different hosts to a certain extent. However, these security protection mechanisms of the transport layer have serious flaws. For example, the sequence number of TCP datagrams is easy to be guessed and inferred, and the calculation of the datagram’s checksum depends on the vulnerable sum of the complement algorithm. As a result, the existing transport layer security mechanisms cannot guarantee the integrity and security of the datagram, which allows a remote attacker to craft a fake datagram and inject it into the target network stream, thus poisoning the target network stream. The attack against the transport layer occurs at the basic layers of the network protocol stack, which can bypass the security protection mechanisms enforced at the upper application layer and thus cause serious damage to the network infrastructure. After investigating various attacks over network protocols and the related security vulnerabilities in recent years, this study proposes a method for enhancing the security of the transport layer? based on lightweight chain verification, namely LightCTL. Based on the hash verification, LightCTL enables both sides of a TCP connection to create a mutually verifiable consensus on transport layer datagrams, so as to prevent attackers or middlemen from stealing and forging sensitive information. As a result, LightCTL can successfully foil various attacks against the network protocol stack, including TCP connection reset attacks based on sequence number inferring, TCP hijacking attacks, SYN flooding attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and datagram replay attacks. Besides, LightCTL does not need to modify the protocol stack of intermediate network devices such as routers. It only needs to modify the checksum and the related parts of the end protocol stack. Therefore, LightCTL can be easily deployed and significantly improves the security of network systems.

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冯学伟,徐恪,李琦,杨宇翔,朱敏,付松涛.轻量级链式验证的网络传输层安全性增强方法.软件学报,2024,35(5):2503-2521

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History
  • Received:June 16,2022
  • Revised:December 06,2022
  • Adopted:
  • Online: August 23,2023
  • Published: May 06,2024
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