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Home > Archive>Volume 29, Issue 9, 2018 >2861-2873. DOI:10.13328/j.cnki.jos.005282
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Research on Differential Diffusion Property of MORUS in Fault Model
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National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572516, 61602514)

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    Abstract:

    MORUS is a third-round CAESAR candidate of authenticated cipher designed by H. Wu et al. With a fault model, the diffusion property of MORUS is analyzed in this paper. By using a bit-oriented random fault model, the search algorithm for the differential chain of MORUS is improved with the usage of differential analysis and meet-in-the-middle technique. Through this algorithm, a 5-step differential chain is discovered with a probability of 2-85. The differential-distinguish attack on the initialization of 5-step reduced version of MORUS-640-128 is proposed with the data complexity of 289 and the distinguishing advantage of 0.99965. By using differential fault analysis method, the forgery attack on 3-step authentication of MORUS-640-128 is formed.

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    附中文参考文献:
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施泰荣,关杰,李俊志,王森鹏.故障模型下MORUS算法的差分扩散性质研究.软件学报,2018,29(9):2861-2873

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History
  • Received:December 17,2016
  • Revised:February 28,2017
  • Online: April 11,2017
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