Formal Logic for Fair Exchange Protocols
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    Abstract:

    The fairness and punctuality of optimistic fair exchange protocols are difficult to analyze by using belief logic. Based on the studies of existing formal models and security attributes in fair exchange, a formal model for logic reasoning and fair exchange protocols is proposed. In the model, the channel errors are transferred to the attacker’s behaviors, the participants are divided into honest and dishonest ones, and the threats are attributed to two types of intruders. Based on the idea of model checking, the protocols are defined as an evolved system that has the Kripke structure, and the parties are considered as processes in an asynchronous environment. The new logic stimulates the time operators to control the transfers among the participants’ behaviors and is simple and easy to use. Through typical optimistic fair exchange protocols, the article demonstrates the course of protocol analysis. Two flaws of the protocol are discovered and improved. The case study shows that the new logic can be used to analyze the fairness and timeliness of fair exchange protocols.

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陈明,吴开贵,吴长泽,徐洁,吴中福.公平交换协议形式逻辑.软件学报,2011,22(3):509-521

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  • Received:November 05,2009
  • Revised:September 06,2010
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