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Price-Based Incentive Mechanism for P2P Anonymous Communication System
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    Abstract:

    This paper proposes a price-based incentive mechanism for P2P anonymous communication system. Through pricing on dummy traffic, relay traffic and export traffic, the P2P anonymous communication system builds a pricing system. The pricing system quantifies the user's system resource production and consumption. First, it can effectively stimulate users in P2P anonymous communication system to provide relay and export services. These services effectively improve system performance. Secondly, the pricing system can motivate free-riders in providing dummy traffic. The dummy traffic enhances the system's anonymity. Finally, the pricing system is also capable of prompting the user to request the appropriate relay nodes according to their needs in order to avoid unnecessary consumption of system resources. User policy analysis based on scenarios confirms the validity of price incentives P2P anonymous communication system.

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郑明,吴建平,刘武.一种基于价格的P2P匿名通信系统激励机制.软件学报,2015,26(S2):52-60

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History
  • Received:May 02,2014
  • Revised:August 22,2014
  • Online: January 11,2016
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