In the white-box attack context, an attacker can access the implementation process of the cryptographic algorithm, observe the dynamic execution and internal details of the algorithm, and modify it arbitrarily. In 2002, Chow et al. proposed the concept of white-box cipher and pointed out the white-box implementation of the AES algorithm and DES algorithm by using lookup table technology, which is called the CEJO framework. The white-box implementation obfuscates the existing cryptographic algorithms, protects the key in the form of software under white-box attack, and ensures the correctness of the algorithm results. SIMON is a lightweight block cipher algorithm, which is widely used in Internet of Things devices because of its great software and hardware performance. It is of great practical significance to study the white-box implementation of this algorithm. This study presents two white-box implementations of the SIMON algorithm. The first scheme (SIMON-CEJO) uses the classical CEJO framework to protect the lookup tables by using network codings, so as to confuse the key. In this scheme, the occupied memory space is 369.016 KB. The security analysis shows that the SIMON-CEJO scheme can resist BGE attack and affine equivalent algorithm attack, but it fails to resist differential computing analysis. The second scheme (SIMON-Masking) uses the encoding method proposed by Battistello et al. to encode the plaintext information and key information, and it uses the homomorphism of encoding to convert the XOR operation and AND operation into modular multiplication and table lookup operation. Finally, the corresponding ciphertext result is obtained by decoding. During the operation of the algorithm, the Boolean mask is added to the AND operation. The randomness of the codings protects the real key information and improves the ability of the scheme to resist differential computing analysis and other attacks. SIMON-Masking occupies 655.81 KB of memory space, and the time complexity of the second-order differential computing based on the Legendre symbol is O(n²klog₂p). The comparison results of the two schemes show that the classical CEJO framework cannot effectively defend against differential computing analysis, but using new coding and adding masks are effective white-box implementation methods.