提出了一种可证安全的入侵容忍签名方案,方案具有比前向安全签名和密钥隔离签名更强的安全性,满足无论签名者和基地被入侵多少次,只要入侵不是同时发生的,其他任何时间段的签名都是安全的.另外,即使入侵者同时入侵签名者和基地,获得所有秘密信息,仍然不能伪造以前时间段的签名.方案具有良好的平均性能,所有费用参数包括密钥产生、基密钥(用户密钥)演化、基密钥(用户密钥)更新、签名、验证的时间和签名长度、公钥长度和基地(用户)存储空间大小的复杂性都不超过O(logT).最后证明,假定CDH问题是

An intrusion-resilient signature scheme with provable security is presented in this paper. The scheme has a stronger security than a forward secure signature scheme and a key-insulated signature scheme. It satisfies that signatures in other time periods are secure even after arbitrarily many compromises of base and signer, as long as the compromises do not happen simultaneously. Furthermore, the intruder cannot generate signatures pertaining to previous time periods, even if she compromises base and signer simultaneously to get their secret information. The scheme has a nice average performance. There is no cost parameter for key generation time, base (user) key updating time, base (user) key refresh time, signing time, verifying time, signature size, public key size, and base (user) storage size having a complexity more than O(logT) in this scheme. At last, this scheme is proven secure in the random oracle model, assuming CDH problem is hard.

Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60703089 (国家自然科学基金); the National High-Tech Research and Development Plan of China under Grant No.2004AA001260 (国家高技术研究发展计划(863)); the Science and Technology Project of Provincia