安全协议的设计与逻辑分析
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(Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60083007 (国家自然科学基金); the National Grand Fundamental Research 973 Program of China under Grant No.G1999035810 (国家重点基础研究发展规划(973))


Design and Logical Analysis of Security Protocols
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    摘要:

    随着网络应用的迅速发展,网络安全的问题日益重要.研究下述课题:安全协议的设计原则;安全协议设计中形式化方法的应用;各种形式化分析方法,特别是逻辑分析方法的特点.另外,还探讨了串空间模型在逻辑分析中的应用以及串空间模型指导安全协议形式化设计的可能性.

    Abstract:

    With the rapid growth of network applications, network security has become an important issue. In this paper, the following issues are investigated: the design principles of security protocols, the use of formal methods in the design of security protocols, the characteristics of various approaches to formal analysis, in particular logical analysis. The strand space approach to logical analysis, and the possibility of the strand space model guiding the formal design of security protocols are also explored.

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卿斯汉.安全协议的设计与逻辑分析.软件学报,2003,14(7):1300-1309

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  • 收稿日期:2003-01-23
  • 最后修改日期:2003-01-23
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