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首页 > 过刊浏览>2021年第32卷第1期 >137-166. DOI:10.13328/j.cnki.jos.006095
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SGX应用支持技术研究进展
作者:
作者简介:

董春涛(1991-),男,博士生,主要研究领域为分布式系统安全,云计算,大数据安全,可信计算.
沈晴霓(1970-),女,博士,教授,博士生导师,CCF高级会员,主要研究领域为操作系统,虚拟化安全,云计算,大数据安全与隐私,可信计算.
罗武(1994-),男,博士生,主要研究领域为操作系统,虚拟化安全,云计算,可信计算,浏览器安全.
吴鹏飞(1994-),男,博士生,主要研究领域为分布式系统安全,隐私保护,大数据安全.
吴中海(1968-),男,博士,教授,博士生导师,CCF杰出会员,主要研究领域为大数据系统与分析,大数据与云安全,嵌入式系统.

通讯作者:

沈晴霓,E-mail:qingnishen@ss.pku.edu.cn

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金（61672062，61232005）


Research Progress of SGX Application Supporting Techniques
Author:
  • DONG Chun-Tao

    DONG Chun-Tao

    School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing 102600, China;National Engineering Research Center for Software Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies of Ministry of Education (Peking University), Beijing 100871, China
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  • SHEN Qing-Ni

    SHEN Qing-Ni

    School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing 102600, China;National Engineering Research Center for Software Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies of Ministry of Education (Peking University), Beijing 100871, China
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  • LUO Wu

    LUO Wu

    School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;National Engineering Research Center for Software Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies of Ministry of Education (Peking University), Beijing 100871, China
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  • WU Peng-Fei

    WU Peng-Fei

    School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing 102600, China;National Engineering Research Center for Software Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies of Ministry of Education (Peking University), Beijing 100871, China
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  • WU Zhong-Hai

    WU Zhong-Hai

    School of Software and Microelectronics, Peking University, Beijing 102600, China;School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;National Engineering Research Center for Software Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;Key Laboratory of High Confidence Software Technologies of Ministry of Education (Peking University), Beijing 100871, China
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Fund Project:

National Natural Science Foundation of China (61672062, 61232005)

  • 摘要
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  • 访问统计
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  • 参考文献 [102]
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  • 相似文献 [20]
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  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    安全与可信是云计算中极为重要的需求，如何保护用户在云平台上托管的应用程序代码和数据的安全、防止云服务提供商和其他攻击者窃取用户机密数据，一直是个难题.2013年，Intel公司提出了新的处理器安全技术SGX，能够在计算平台上提供一个用户空间的可信执行环境，保证用户关键代码及数据的机密性和完整性.SGX技术自提出以来，已成为云计算安全问题的重要解决方案.如何有效地应用SGX技术来保护用户的应用程序，成为近年来的研究热点.介绍了SGX的相关机制和SDK，概括了SGX应用所面临的安全问题、性能瓶颈问题、开发困难问题和功能局限性等问题，总结并归纳了SGX应用支持技术的研究进展，包括SGX应用安全防护技术、SGX应用性能优化技术、SGX应用辅助开发技术和SGX功能扩展技术，并展望了未来的发展方向.

    Abstract:

    Security and trustworthiness are extremely important requirements for cloud computing. How to protect critical application code and data on the cloud platform and prevent cloud service providers and other attackers from stealing user's confidential data is a difficult problem. In 2013, Intel proposed a new processor security technology SGX, which can provide a trusted execution environment for user space on the computing platform to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of critical user code and data. Since SGX technology is proposed, it has gradually become an important solution to cloud computing security issues. How to effectively apply SGX technology to protect application has become research a hotspot in recent years. In this paper, the mechanisms and SDK of SGX are introduced, and the bottlenecks such as security issues, performance bottlenecks, development difficulties, and function limitations faced by SGX application are summarized. The research progress of SGX application supporting techniques are analyzed and summarized, including SGX application security protection technique, SGX application performance optimization technique, SGX application assisted development technique, and SGX function extension technique. Finally, the development directions of SGX application supporting techniques are suggested.

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董春涛,沈晴霓,罗武,吴鹏飞,吴中海. SGX应用支持技术研究进展.软件学报,2021,32(1):137-166

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  • 收稿日期:2019-11-24
  • 最后修改日期:2020-05-14
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