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可证明安全性理论与方法研究
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Supported by the National Grand Fundamental Research 973 Program of China under Grant No.G1999035802(国家重点基础研究发展规划(973));the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.60273027(国家自然科学基金)


Research on Theory and Approach of Provable Security
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    摘要:

    论述了可证明安全性理论在安全方案与安全协议的设计与分析中的应用,内容主要包括:什么是可证明安全性,可证明安全性理论涉及到的一些基本概念,RO(random oracle)模型方法论的基本思想及其在公钥加密和数字签名等方案中的应用研究进展,标准模型下可证明安全性理论在公钥加密和数字签名等方案中的应用研究进展,以及可证明安全性理论在会话密钥分配协议的设计与分析中的应用研究进展.

    Abstract:

    This paper presents a survey on the theory of provable security and its applications to the design and analysis of security protocols. It clarifies what the provable security is, explains some basic notions involved in the theory of provable security and illustrates the basic idea of random oracle model. It also reviews the development and advances of provably secure public-key encryption and digital signature schemes, in the random oracle model or the standard model, as well as the applications of provable security to the design and analysis of session-key distribution protocols and their advances.

    参考文献
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冯登国.可证明安全性理论与方法研究.软件学报,2005,16(10):1743-1756

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  • 收稿日期:2004-07-06
  • 最后修改日期:2005-08-24
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